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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TriE STATE OF UTAH 
FRANK SA.NT , 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
ORLANDO JESSE MILLER, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
fO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH: 
Comes now Frank Sant, appellant above 
named, and respeethlly represents in its 
decision rendered by Justice Latimer in the 
above entitled cause, t_he court erred 1n the 
following particulars: 
I. 
The decision as rendered assumes facts 
Which do not actually exist and which are 
not a part of the record in case at bar. 
II. 
The decision as rendered -rails to take 
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copdzance or facts 1D the record and to which 
raets appellant is entitled to have assume·d in 
his :ravor where verdict is directed against him. 
III. 
the decision as rendered lays down untenable 
law where the issue of contributOl'J' negligence 
is 1nvol ved. 
IV. 
The decision as rendered is contradictory 
1n itself as to th-e law appliea.ble to the 
case. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that a ~e­
hearing or said cause be granted. 
Harvey A. Sjostrom 
Attorney ~or Plaint1~f and Appellant. 
I, Harvey A. Sjostrom, attorney ~or appellant 
and petitioner above named, lto hereby certify 
that in my opinion there is good reason to be-
lieve that the decision and opinion of the abr>ve 
entitled court is erroneous in the particulars 
set forth in the foregoing petition and that 
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ahe cause therein re~erred to ought to be re-
tDmined. 
Respectfully, 
Harvey A. SJostrom 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
AllGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The ass1gmaents of-· error will be discussed 
t:e1ether because they are so inter-woven and 
involved one w1 th another in their bearing on 
the opinion o~ the Court in the said cause. 
ThE. / 5 r FuLL 
In the first part o:rl\ paragraph on page 
number two or the holdL.11g, Justice Latimer, 
recites that appellant "looked to. the north, 
saw the car eo.aing, stepped for from 3 to 5 
seeonds in the main travelled portion of' the 
street and during this time, -Pailed to watch 
the movement or cars from the north. " From 
this language it is evident that the writer 
assumes that appellant merely &lanced at the 
cars than failed to continue to look any more 
for a space o-r -rrom 3 to ' seconds. Such 
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assumption is entirely at variance with the 
record for no where does it appear that he 
discontinued looking at the cars until he 
turned his head 1n a sQuthwesterly direction 
and it was just as he turned his head that 
he was struck. 
To substantiate that-he did more than 
glance we quete frOil de~endant 's br1e'f. on 
page 9 · thereo~, where defendant quotes. 
appellant as ~ollows: "JaY wt:re, I had my· 
arm thru hers and I saw ears coming fr011 tl'le 
north and hesitated or st-opped just across 
the nils to see what . ~ose ~~rs ~er-e cO:lu 
to do." Certainly this language shows clon• 
tinued observance and deliberation by appell-
ant up until he turned his attention in a 
southwesterly dire-ction when he evidently 
concluded that tha·re was no danger to himself' 
and his wife in the situation. Up to that 
time he~ had no reason to believe nor did his 
Wife believe that de-Pendant would, suddtnJ:l 
swervA to the left and run him down. T-hat he 
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was alert is evidenced by that fact, "that he 
hesitated or stopped just across the rails !2 
see what those cars wert goin,g to do." ( tr. 125") 
Those cars too, it must be remembered, were 
1110re than •sl1ghtl7" to the west o-r appellant 
as the writer of' the opinion puts it, but were 
nearer the west curb which would be at least 
10 feet west o'f him. (appellant} (tr. 187) 
!here are a1so the-se further ~acts as 
shown by the reeordt The light at the inter--
section at 1st South and Main was either yellow 
or red (tr. 126) pointing to- the north and. the 
ear ahead o-r respondent's ·was slowing up evid.ent-
17 pr-eparatory to stopping (tr. 25'9, 26-0) ~or 
east and wes.t bound tra:rf'ic. Then too, the 
eross--walk was onlY, a mere 79 feet ( tr. 219) 
from where the, accident took plaee so appellant 
would haYe a right to assume that respondent 
Would be slowing up preparatory to stopping. 
fheae facts together with the undispute-d fact 
that an object the- .,_siae o-r a man could be seen 
a block away was certainly reason su~~icient to 
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uke any reasonable man think that everything 
was O.K. Even though Mrs. Sant was looking at 
~~· ~ 
the very titRe respondent swerved and immediately 
stepped baek and eried out, together with the 
fact that h-er eoat was jerked ~rom her person 
by defendant's car indicates how ~aat she 
stepped baek aad is strong added proo~ that 
rupondent was well within 30 +"'eet of plaintiff 
when he suddenly swerved and that she was a 
'ery much surprised per~so:n. (tr. 258) In the 
light of these ~acts and others which will be 
presentl:y pointed out ean we say tl1.at the 
plaintif-f was negligent ? 
The law states plainti~f should not have 
crossed where he did, yet the law :ru.rther 
states in 57-7-144 (a) •Notwithstanding the 
foregoing provisions o;:- this act {whi-ch pre-
vious has to do with the respective right-o1'-
ways or drivers and pedestrians 57-7-141, 
57-7-142, 57-7-143) every driver of a vehicle 
shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with 
any ~edestr1ans upon any roadway and shall g1 ve 
'~:~\ ::,·~~~-. ~~~4~>. ~~!i· ~~ 
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warning by sounding the horn when necessarY" 
and shall exercise proper precaution upon 
observing any child or any 1neapae1tated 
person upon a roadwa:y" and states (sub-sea. 
c. or '7-7-1139 ttthe driver or every vehicle 
shall, eonsistant with the requirements of 
nbdivision (a) o~ this section, 4r1ve at an 
appropriate reduced speed when approaching 
and crossing an intersection or roadway cross-
~ ---- and when special 'hazard exists with 
respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by 
reasons o~ weather or_highway conditions." 
And as stated in Dalley .vs •. Midwestern Dairy 
Products Co. (80 tft. 331, 336, 1? P. (2nd) 309) 
and af~irmed in many other -eases by this Court 
it is negligence as a matter of law to drive 
a car upon a public highway at sueh rate of 
speed that a car cannot be stopped within a 
distance at which the driver is a.ble to see 
objects upon the highway 1n front o-r him. 
We do not call the courts attention to 
these sections ~or the mere purpose of show~ 
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1ng the negligence o.,. the de+'endant, but ~or 
the purpose o~ showing that plainti~~ had a 
right to expect -f"rom de+"endant a reasonable 
leokout and plainti-r~ cannot be charged with 
negllgenee because he .,.ailed to anticipate 
defendant's ~allure to so do as will herein-
after be more ful.ly pointed out and cases 
cited in support thereo~. 
Neither the ordinances o-r Logan City or the 
Statutes o~ the State o~ Utah prohibiting 
eros-sing between intersectior.lB can ·be con-
strued as to sanction a relaxation of' vigilence 
on the part o~ drivers o~ automobiles upon 
public streets as that would run c-ounter to 
it.s evident intent, and if this is so, plain-
t!+'~ had every :eeason to rely on the thought 
that de~endant had seen him when he turned his 
head. In the absence of' discerning or ,being 
bound to anticipate that defendant probably 
would attempt to pass, he also had a right to 
rely on this: that def'endant having made no 
indication up to within about 30 reet o-r him 
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that he would pass the other car that he did 
not intend to pass and particularly so in a 
sudden and erratie way that he did. Then too 
there was the added reason ti1at the light was 
yellow or red, another car moving slowly evident-
ly preparato17 to stopping -ror said light and that 
an object could be seen f'or a. block away and 1.,.. 
an object could be seen for a block away did he 
have any reason to believe that de-rendant had 
not seen him under sueh a condition together 
with the fact that neadlight-s were fully on, 
on de-rendant 1 s ear. 
Plainti+-f, as a reasonable man, had every 
reason to believe that de-rendant was ke:eping a 
reasonable lookout and that he and his w1~e 
had been seen. Can this court say that under 
the "'acts and circuJnstances o-r this case that 
plainti+-'f', aet1ng as a. reasonable man, ha-d no 
reasonable grounds, so to assume ? Vle believe 
NOT, and 1-r we are right in this can 1 t be s-aid 
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that though this is true he was reasonably 
bound to anticipate tl1e negligence or recklesa--
ness of' the defendant in suddenly swerving and 
running him down ? ~~e believe NOT, -ror it is 
said in the case o-f-' Dobson - Peacock vs. Curtis, 
186 S.E. 13, 166 Va. 55"0 that ••P•destr·ian cross--
ing street ·between intersections, although 
eharged with knowl~ge that automobile whi.ch she 
had seen was approaching, ~:~was not charged with 
~ledge that motorist was not keeping a proper 
lookout and had right to assume that motorist 
proeeeding along street would keep reasonable 
lookout. n 
In the case o-r Kennelly vs. V/aropajak 109 
Atlantic 608, the driver suddenly, as in ttle 
1nstant case, swerv-ed to miss a hole in the 
road and th-e court here also stated that ped-
estrian was not bound to anticipate negligence 
or awerYing o.P car. To the s,ame e-r-Peet- is 
Safron va. ii.m. ?ee Co., 6.6 Pa •. Super 419. 
u A mere error o:r judgment is not negligence 
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1r an ord1nar117 prudent man would have made 
the same error". So reads 4S C.J. 953, citing··· 
William Est. Co. vs. Nevada Wonder Co. 196 P. 
644. And to«establish contributory negligence 
as a matter o--r law, the act_ relied en ~st be. 
i1stinct, prominent and decisive, and one about 
. . - . '\ 
which ordinary m-1nds cannot di~--Per". Gudelsly 
vs. Bone 23 J.. (2nd) 694. 
While it may be true in certain cases that. 
a person who is himsel:r breaking a law which 
was en.acted ~or his sarety may not rely as a 
~matter of law upon ~he presumption that another 
will:-~-~o~ breach his statutory or other duties 
.he may as he did in this case. rely upon the 
' "' ., 
aetual.:surrounding circumstantte or .Pactual 
situation that his sa-rety· .would not be dis-
turbe·d by the sudden erratic swervj~ng o-f' the 
de-f'endant. To this ef~ect is ~/[cPherson vs. 
Walling et. al, 209 Pac. 209, and above re-
ferred to cases. 
The writer ~rther states that the plainti~~ 
knew he was standing in a "position o"' danger'' 
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that 1 t would be di ~-ricul t ~or motorist to see 
him and his wife. Th'e facts o-r this ease do 
,, 
not warrant such a statement. He was neithe~~ 
1n a •position of dangern which has hereto~ore 
been shown, :-or he was at least 10 ~eet east 
of a car that was not more than 30 :feet to the 
north of» him when he turned his bead, nor is 
there any ground for saying that a motorist 
would have di~icu.lty in seeing him ~or an 
object could be seen for a bloek, and added 
to this there was the lights of the oncoming 
cars. (See plainti~~'s reply brie+- as· to 
"position o:r danger. n 
Here was deliberation on part o~ the plain-
ti-r-r -ror as pointed out he testi-Pied nmy wi-re, 
I had lf1' arm thru hers and I saw cars coming 
from the north and hesitated or stopped just 
across the rails tp see what" those clars were :L 
uw to do. n T'his being tl1e te,stimony, was 
he. guilty o-r negl.igenee whe,n he momentarily 
took his eyes, o~f the de~endant's car which 
was then not more than 30 feet to the north 
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and not less than 10 4-e·et to the west o+" him 
and this too when the light at the intersection 
was yellow or red, an object could be seen a 
ltloek away, the lights o~ the cars were ~ly 
lRlrn1ng, the ear ahead o.,. de+"endant was moving 
slow evidently preparatory to stopping ~or light; 
Mrs. Sant saw no·th!ng in the si tuat1on which 
excited her in the least up to the time or the 
sudden swerve ofl def'endant • s car~ 
The opinion states that lira-. Sant was reason-
ably alert and therefore escap·ed in_jury. The 
fact is that Mr. Sant was equally alert i -r not 
more so because he te·sti.,.ied that he "stopped 
or hesitated to see what those cars wer:§ g()itlg 
to do" showing, without question, tttat he was 
·r ~ 
alert .Por as the cars came along to th~e west of 
him he had in mind what those ears might do in 
regard to passing, but decided that tb.ere was 
no probability 1n anT car so doina and saw no 
probab111 ty o-r danger to himsel.P or wi-re evident-
ly was concerned about the parties ahead as to 
their sar·ety as the cars were -rurther to the 
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west "closer to the Cllrb". Mrs. Sant testi-fl'ied 
as ~ollows: Q. "Do you lmow which way J~J.r. Sant 
was looking just be-f'ore tr1e collision occurred ? 11 
A. "No, Sir, I do not, I was just stan.dir"" there 
just casually looking down the street as we were 
stopped waiting ~or the ears. u (tr. 2?0 and pp. 
7 respondent 1 s brie~) (There u.sed to be a cross-
walk about where they crossed. Tr. 271) This 
1s certainly very strong proo-r in showifls that 
there was no question which arose in her mind 
"as to what those cars were going to don as 
that ques tior ... ) 1 ~ it arose, had been_ settled and 
put her at ease a~" it was only because sl1e 
happened to be looking at the ears at the time 
o.P the de~endant 's sudde-n swerve that saved her, 
not that her alertness was above that of ti!Ir. 
Sant's ~or the -Pactual situation had put her 
mind completely a_t rest on what those ears were 
going to do - she certainly expected no erratic 
sudden swerve and passing and neither would any 
other prude·nt person including appellant under 
the circumstances. Inasmuch as 1.1rs. Sant only 
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escaped by a "hair's breath'·' can it be said that 
1-r Mr. Sant had also been looking and •·aw the 
sudden swerve at the time his w1~e did that he 
would have as a matter o~ +'act escaped injury ? 
We believe not. 
·Here, if anything, wa.s an excusable mistake of 
judgment that any prudent person might make and 
it is said in the case in volume 13 A.{2nd) 121, 
124, "Only when~· the danger is so obvious· that an 
ordinary prudent person would regard it as a 
hazard, and therefore avoid it, is a pe·rs-on tak~ 
1ng a chance guilty of' contributory negligence 
as a matter o~ law. n "Whetl1er a mistake in judg-
ment by a pedestrian when crossing a street, as 
to speed and danger o-P an approaching vehicle,. 
const1 tutes negligence is a question of the jury, n 
so states the Court in Kirk vs. Los Angeles. 
R. Corp. 161 P. (2) 673, 164. A.L.R. p 3 note ll. 
The opinion conceedes and conclu_des that a 
pedestrian cr:Jssing between intersections, even 
in contravention o~ a statute, need not antici-
pate that a motorist will suddenly change his 
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rule o-f' law does not control the -ractual sit,-
' ' 
uation, '"Because o.,. the violation o~ the quoted 
ordinance and statute, appellant was on the 
street at a prohibited place, and under these 
circumstances, he was required to constantly 
observe the movement of tra:r.fic from the direc-
tion it should legally travel. u This ·is not 
and cannot be the law and is in direct contra-
diction or the conceded law by the learned 
Justice and cases ·nereto:f'ore cited. Neither 
counsel or the Justice cite any eases in support 
o"' such a rule of law and we venture to say that 
# 
no case can be f'ound. I~ the plainti -?-P did not 
have to anticipate the sudden change o~ cour·se 
by the motorist as a matter o-P la"Y \What was there 
in the +"actual situation v1hich changed that up 
to and at the instant prior to appellant looking 
in a southwesteT.ly direction .t>or his -Priends and 
observing at the same time the signal ligh·t as 
being eitl1er red or yellow. There was absolutely 
nothing to put a person o~ prudence on notice 
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o+' the sudden el1ange or swerve to come, so the 
ease comes squarely under the a on ceded l.aw, -
that appellant did not have to anticipate said 
swerve as a matter o'f' law and certainly aot 
+'rom the -racts surrounding the accident. The 
Justice .fUrther observes in the first fUll par-
agraph o-c:- the last page, tl1atz urie was required 
to anticipate that vehicles move at d.i -r·~er·,eat 
rates o.P speed; that the slower moving automobiles 
are required to drive on the ·risht-hand side o~ 
their appropriate portion of the highway and 
+'aster mov·iq vehicles pass to their leflt; that 
the "'aster moving vehieles may not c·ontir1ue in 
a direct line but may turn out .(.'rom a straight 
f'ormat1on to go around the slower moving car, 
and that such movements may be rnade by reasonably 
sa-re drivers i-t- they do not kn:O:w, or ltave no 
reas,on to ~e c.h.i:lrged_ lw:\ th .knQw)..edge. that ped-
estrians will be endanger:ed by sucr.t moveLaents. 
, . . .. -., . . - -~ -
Particularly is st1ch tl1e case when the driver 
at all times remains on l1is proper side o.P the 
highway. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- 17 -
Can it not be said that under the f'a.ets o.,. 
th1s ease that the de~endant is charged with 
haring seen the plaint!~.- at least 150 +'eet 
from the plaee oft impact and can 1 t not be 
said also that plainti-P~ had .every reas-on to 
believe under the ~acts o~ this case as here-
to-rore and as will immediately be pointed out \.,, 
. '~ 
that de~endant had seen plainti .r:-~ and there-rore 
plaint!~~ was in no dange~. 
In the last paragraph on page 2 o~ the 
opinion Justice Latimer states that bec-ause 
plaintir~ stood still would not neces-sartly 
clear h.im o.,. negligence.. No lfb.ere in the brie-r 
o-r respondent have _I seen a claim that just 
as soon as plainti--f!tl-f" saw the cars coming .Prom 
the north he should have stepped bael~. !for can 
such a statement be prop-erlJr made -4'or he was 
10 .l'eet, at least, to t·he east o-P the oncoming 
cars. 
In the second paragraph o~ page 3 o~ the 
opinion it is stated that, "He knew he was 
leaving a place of' sa-rety to travel a hazard--
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ous course across the road. It was late at 
aight, dark and cloudy and the streets were 
wet. It was midwinter and the parties were 
dressed in dull colors. Appellant was wearing 
a brown overcoat and his wife a gray coat 
thrown over her shoulders. n The answer to 
this is: They observed· the street was clear 
to the south when they started acrass {tr. 124) 
an.d when they got to the middle of the street 
they obse~Yed 2 or three ears coming ~rom the 
aorth on the west side o-r street. (tr. 124-125) 
An object such as a man cottld be seen a block 
away {tr. 217 - 231) and de+-endant's headlights 
were fully burning (tr. 306); lights were good 
and would show an object 2 or 3 hundred :Peet 
ahead. (tr. 306 - 307) This being so was th• 
pla1nt1~~ unwarranted as a reasonable man in 
thinking he and his wi~e had been seen by de,-
f'etJ.dant when de-rend.a11t was within at least 15 
or 20 rods o.,!a them and certainly had been seen 
just pr1o·r to de'f'endant turning his head and 
that de-rendant would not be negligent. Then too. 
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would not the gray coat o~ the lVi ~e show llP very 
well at the distance mentioned or ·"'or tl1at 
matter any eo lor. The op~ion -rurther states, 
"AsJ~UJ~:lng he had been standing there some 4 or 
5 seconds he was not watching trat'fic approach-
ing -Prom the north which would be the direction 
'rom whic.h he knew tra.-Nc was coming and 4"rom 
which it legally must come." The answer to 
such a statement is this: That he was looking 
to the north ~or l1e testi~ied:. "1!y ti-re, I had 
my arm thru hers. I saw cars coming ttrom the 
- . '-' ' . 
north and hesitated or stopped just across the 
rails to see v;hat. ~f\ose cars . v;ere going \e.~l!i?·" 
(tr. 125') "While standing tl1ere ~or those cars 
.b _..-:-. 
to advance, I looked t~ my le-¥'t to see wtlere 
our companions were. ~iow anyone can tel1 :Iou 
about as well ftr-:>r.1 tt1ere as I ca11. That's 
where I was - just as I turned and looJ:ced is 
where I was struck. '1 Does not this language 
show that he v.;as attentive to the cars coming 
~om the north and that he had come to the 
conclusion trat he t1ad been seen and +"rom the 
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position o~ the cars that there would be 110 
passing or negligence on part o"' de-Pendant. 
It has never been :~1y practice to seek 
private audience with any member o-r this Court 
coneerning any case -Por which I was attorney, 
but that does not mean that I do- not -reel 
equally as sincere as thos-e who gain these 
audiences. 
As attorney ~or the appellant in this cause 
I would :eel neglect~ull, indeed, 1~ I did not 
-.., - .... 
make this petition ~or rehearing 4'eelirlg as I 
do concerning the .r.-aets a11d tl-~e law applicable 
thereto. ..b;qually g1:~ilty o~ neglect would I 
. -
-reel, to this t.:!ov..rt, i.,. I .fail e.d to aid 1 t in 
1 ts search -"'or and administration of justice 
in this cause. 
In this n1atter I believe I have stated the 
evidence corre-ctly as iilell as ti_1e law·, and now 
there is only one thing more I can do ar.td that 
~ - . 
is to hope that this Court is not M overcrowded 
with other work as not to be able to give ~ull 
and adequate time to the consideration o-r-- this 
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. ~, ....... ·. · .. 
petition -ror a re-examiil.at·!on o-r this cause so 
as to assure justice to all parties concerned. 
I believe, most sincerely, that after such re-
examination has been made this Court will be 
t. 
able to say that the question or contributory 
negliaenee was ~or the jury and not one -ror 
the Court. I hope 'for sueh a ruling. Perhaps 
I am in error. It is .,.or yo-ur Honors to decide,. 
Whatever that de-e is ion is we umst abifle by. 
Respeett'ully submitted, 
-- - .I-· 
Harvey A. Sjostrom 
Attorney +-or Plainti'f~ and Appellant. 
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In the case o~ 0 1Jie111 vs. Ewert 189 
App. Div. 221, 178 :J.Y, ~')Upp. 5'o6, 79 41-.I,.R. 
page 1086, othe,r cases &lUlOta ted commencing 
on page 1076 same volume, the plalnt1~f' look• 
ed and saw the automobile approaching E;o ~eet 
awaT• 1.- the automGbU• had continued in it.a 
course th• pla1nti~· would have llad to pro-
ceed but ; or 6 -reet to be beyoad 4aar,er o-P 
be1ni struck. The court held that his .,.af.l .. 
ure to look a second time under aueh eUtYW~-­
stanoes was not eontri &tory nqli~f~Dee as a 
matter o.,. lalr. !he eo1u-t also a.aidr nrhe 
law does aot put upo.a a pedeatriaa t-he burdea 
of looking aD.7 particular muaber o~ tille~s, nor 
does it say when he 1&\St look. Ile 1s cot 
bound, as a matter o'*' law, to let)k at a 
particular time, and, as matt,er o~ law, be 
1s not called upoa to stop to allow the pass-
1Dg o.,. an approaeh1ng vehicle." 
- .-.. -
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